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ABSTRACT
Genocide in Rwanda: Understanding Why They Died
by
Joseph Sambou
Advisor: Glenn Petersen
The primary objective of this research is to critically examine the elements that caused the 1994
genocide in Rwanda, and provide and intelligible, logical explanation of why the victims were
killed. I will also reveal how many civilian lives could have been saved if the international
community had intervened appropriately. It is my contention that to understand why the 1994
Rwandan genocide occurred, three important and closely interconnected dynamics in the history
of Rwanda need to be conceptualized - because absent one of them the genocide would not have
taken place. First, the colonial political legacy, which established the political identities of the
Hutu and Tutsi and glorified the Tutsi over the Hutu, initiated the animosity between the Hutu
and Tutsi that precipitated a cascade of violent events leading to the genocide. Second, the 1959
revolution, which marked a strong demand for decolonization and freedom from the Tutsi
absolute monarchy by the Hutu. This demand for decolonization and liberation ushered in a
restructuring that vested the majority Hutu with absolute control and enforced their identities as
the “rightful native” of Rwanda and the minority Tutsi as “nonindigenous.” Third, the invasion
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1990 - which Hutu extremists perceived as a challenge
to “Hutu Power” and, a signal of the return to the days of servitude, was the last straw.
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Introduction
The systematic targeting and killing of a particular group or groups of people based on
their race, gender, creed, origin, or ethnicity – otherwise known today as genocide – has been a
constant evil presence that has been part of the history of humankind for many centuries. For
example: The Greeks’ destruction of Troy; the Roman army’s demolition of the people of
Carthage; and the Emperor Genghis Khan’s genocidal reign in Asia (Feierstein 2014). In the Old
Testament, there are many stories in which armies were ordered to annihilate particular groups –
including their women and children – such that they cease to exist as an identity. It is not clear
when the word “genocide” itself was coined, but “[T]he term “genocide” was first used by the
Polish-Jewish legal scholar Raphael Lemkin at a conference in Madrid in 1933” (ibid). Some
anthropologists that have studied the history of genocide attribute the genesis of the term right
after Christ. Notwithstanding, the gravity and severity in which genocides have been carried out
over the years have differed. Some were carried out in such controlled, small scale that even
calling them genocide could stir controversy. For example, Columbus’ encounter and subsequent
annihilation of the indigenous people in America; the cultural destruction and extermination of
the Dakota people and other native groups by the United States are events that provoke heated
debates whenever they are referred to as genocides (Nunpa 2013). However, others - such as the
terrible ordeal of the Jews in the hands of the German Nazi Party - were more pervasive and
obvious. Even more recent is a case that provoked the writing of this paper: the Rwanda
Genocide of 1994. The aim of this paper is to critically analyze the causes of the 1994 Rwandan
genocide and provide a more intelligible understanding of why it happened.
The postcolonial era in the vast African continent left many African states in a dire
struggle for survival and societies searching for a sense of indigeneity. Rwanda is no exception
1

to this phenomenon. Of course, not all outcomes of colonialism are negative or necessarily bad.
Some societies have benefited – and still do – as a result of their colonial experience. For
example, some had access to modern medicine to fight diseases that were deemed incurable with
local, traditional medicine. Others experienced improved infrastructure, education, and
progressive systems of governance and economic management. However, there are societies like
in Rwanda whose encounter with Europeans and subsequent colonization proved utterly ruinous.
The consequences of colonialism in Rwanda started to manifest almost immediately after
the 1959 revolution. But the most brutal effect of that era was realized starting on April 6, 1994,
when within a period of just 100 days, 800,000 Rwandans were brutally murdered in one of the
most horrifying conflicts of the 20st century (an average of 8000 people each day). The genocide
was precipitated by a culmination of politically motivated violent events and a civil war during a
four year period that claimed the lives of thousands of people in Rwanda. The Slaughter, which
began with the assassination of the country’s president when his plane was shot down by a
surface-to-air missile, was perpetrated and directed by members of a very influential Hutu
extremist group (the Akazu) in an attempt to wipe the minority Tutsi group in Rwanda off the
face of the earth. Some reports even indicate that up to a million people were slaughtered.
According to Peterson (2001), “[T] he nature of the killing, with so many thrown into pit latrines
or buried and dissolving in dank mass graves, makes an accurate count impossible.” For three
months Tutsis, including some moderate Hutus and Tutsi sympathizers, were systematically
targeted and butchered to death using machetes, guns, clubs, garden tools, and other sharp and
heavy objects that could bleed the life out of the human body. The aftermath of that atrocious
event has left politicians, scholars and philosophers, who were already overcome by similar
upsetting events like the Holocaust that the Jews endured in Nazi Germany, searching for
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answers to understand why they died. “Understanding why they died is the best and most fitting
memorial we can raise for the victims” (Hintjens 1999).
As a consequence, this paper asks the following questions: 1) why did the Rwanda
genocide occur, or why did the Hutu want to bring the extinction of the Tutsi? 2) How did the
Hutu extremists go about orchestrating the genocide? 3) What postcolonial system of
administration or political organizations were implemented that facilitated the genocide? 4) What
justification(s) did the Hutu give for attempting to annihilate the entire Tutsi ethnic group? The
main argument in this paper is that the cause of the Rwanda genocide can be attributed to three
different but equally significant and devastating events: The Legacy of colonialism; the 1959
Revolution, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion of 1990. I will also attempt to
demonstrate how the international community could have significantly decreased the civilian
death toll when the killing started. As stated earlier, the national suicide in Rwanda has netted the
attention of scholars in virtually every discipline in academia. What follows is a review of what
some of them have written about it.

Current Literature
The inhumane nature of genocidal violence motivated an overwhelming number of
political analysts and scholars to pay particular attention to understanding the causes of genocide,
and as a result several experts have since surfaced. For most of them (Mamdani 2001;
Lemarchand 1995; Hitjens 1999) however, their focus has been on the effects of genocide - from
its onset, during, and termination. Indeed, some of them have examined the causes of genocide.
In his analyses of why the Rwandan genocide occurred, Mamdani (2001) maintains that the
origin of the conflict is fundamentally related to how “Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as
political identities.” In that system, Mamdani argues, Hutus were branded as indigenous and the
3

Tutsi as “alien.” Mamdani doesn’t really tackle the question of who is Hutu and who is Tutsi?
Instead, he argues that the two identities have evolved over time to conform to the standards
heralded by the post-revolution Hutu government. Consequently, there cannot be a “single
answer that pins Hutu and Tutsi as [Trans historical] identities.” Essentially, the question is
irrelevant as far as Mamdani is concerned. The two main important events that the genocide
brings into focus, according to Mamdani, are the 1959 “social” revolution and the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion of 1990. He notes that the revolution perpetuated the racial
identities that were constructed by colonialism. And the RPF invasion, which signifies a “citizen
crisis on both the Ugandan and the Rwandan sides of the border,” ought to be regarded as an
“armed repatriation of Banyarwanda (people of Rwanda) refugees from Uganda.” At bottom,
Mamdani and I both agree that the 1959 revolution and the RPF invasion played a weighty part
in causing the genocide, but our analysis slightly differ. Mamdani doesn’t think the revolution, in
and of itself, was a bloodbath as many claim. He argues that it was the “… attempted restoration
and the repression that followed, that opened the gateway to a blood-soaked political future for
Rwanda.” This assertion is not at all implausible, but is it conceivable to extricate the “attempted
restoration” from the revolution itself? I think not. The “attempted restoration” that Mamdani
attributes the cause of the “blood-soaked” political nature of Rwanda to is, in actuality, what
makes up the revolution, which paved the way for the repression that followed.
Subsequently, in addressing the sequence of events that led to the genocide, Hintjens
(1999) attempts to create a parallel between the Rwandan genocide and the Nazi Holocaust in
Germany. She argues that if the aim is to identify the particular dynamics of a genocide in a
particular case, such a parallel is desirable. She maintains that the similarities between the two
events lies in the “extent of ideological and military preparation prior to the genocide, and in the
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systematic use of conspiracy theories and myths to justify covert plans for slaughter.” To
Hintjens, the sequence of events that occasioned the genocide originate from severe economic
depression. She concludes that “the drop in coffee prices in the mid-1980s set off a period of
political extremism and search for solutions that was to lead to scapegoating and physical
extermination of a large part of the total Rwandan population.” I follow Hintjens’ conclusion in
my analysis. However, in my approach below, my argument will show that the economic
depression served both as an incentive and a justification for committing the atrocities. To
demonstrate how structural factors contributed to the genocide, Uvin (1997) - in his article asks, “What kind of social and political processes have taken place that can bring lose the values,
restraints and ethics that under normal circumstances make these actions impossible, and
abhorrent to contemplate?” He concludes that “racist prejudice was a structural feature of
Rwandan society, fulfilling simultaneously important political functions for the elites and sociopsychological functions for the peasant masses.” He asserts that the “racist prejudice” was
“institutionalized and state-sponsored.” My response to the structure-oriented question is
somewhat similar to Uvin’s conclusion in that I, too, highlight how the government adopted
exclusionary and discriminatory policies that made it hard for the Tutsi to gain any form of
political power in the country. Nonetheless, unlike Uvin, I abstain from using “racial prejudice”
to reason the cause of discrimination against the Tutsi. I believe vengeance for past abuses and
fear of losing power was what motivated the government to discriminate against the Tutsi. This
is not to say that Uvin’s argument is irrational. Of course, it is uncontroversial that Tutsis were
targeted because they were Tutsi, but can we really justify the claim that racism, not vengeance,
was what motivated the government to attempt to raze the Tutsi, given the Hutu experience
under the Tutsi monarchy?
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Furthermore, while the above studies provide a good account of what transpired, they
have not sufficiently provided a critical analysis of why the decision was made to exterminate
the Tutsi. Was it fundamentally a good versus evil affair? Or was it a result of dangerous
misconception, ignorance, and stereotypes? My postulation suggests the latter. As stated earlier,
the primary objective of this paper is to critically examine the elements that caused the 1994
genocide, and reveal how many civilian lives could have been saved if the international
community had intervened appropriately. It is my contention that to understand why the 1994
Rwandan genocide occurred, three important and closely interconnected dynamics in the history
of Rwanda need to be conceptualized - because absent one of them the genocide would not have
taken place.
First, the colonial political legacy, which established the political identities of the Hutu
and Tutsi and glorified the Tutsi over the Hutu, initiated the animosity between the Hutus and
Tutsis that would later cause a cascade of violent events leading to the genocide. Second, the
1959 revolution, which marked a period of stout, robust demand for decolonization and freedom
from the Tutsi absolute monarchy by the Hutu. This demand for decolonization and liberation
ushered in a restructuring that vested the majority Hutu with absolute control and enforced their
identities as the “rightful native” of Rwanda and the minority Tutsi as “nonindigenous.” Third,
the invasion of the RPF in 1990, which Hutu extremists viewed as a challenge to “Hutu Power”
and a signal of the return to the days of servitude, was the last straw. In order to put these events
into perspective, I divide the paper into six different sections, with the first four introducing the
role that the three dynamics highlighted above played in making the genocide a possibility. The
fifth section discusses the role of the international community, and the final section is my
conclusion. The key questions that this essay is attempting to tackle are: 1) why did the genocide
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occur? 2) How did the Hutu extremists go about orchestrating the genocide? 3) What
postcolonial system of administration or political processes were implemented that facilitated the
genocide. 4) What justification(s) did the Hutu give for attempting to annihilate the entire Tutsi
ethnic group? And finally, how should the international community have responded to the
slaughter? The evidence used here to support my causal analysis is distilled mostly from extant
literature, and a little from personal experience with refugees from Rwanda. I now turn to the
discussion of the history of the two groups that concern this paper.

Historical Background of the Hutu and Tutsi
It is almost impossible to understand the cause of the genocide without a fairly good
knowledge of who the Hutu and Tutsi really are. This is not to say, however, that the answer is
straightforward. In fact, the question is one of the most serious issues that Rwandans, even today,
struggle to address. Notwithstanding, there is another minority group, the Twa (a midget-like
group that forms about 1% of the population), which seems to be left out of most conversations
about the ethnic groups in Rwanda. Almost all of the literature on the genocide in Rwanda
identify them as one of the ethnic groups in Rwanda, but virtually none discusses how the
genocide affected them. Were they victims too or perpetrators? They must have been involved
somehow; they are certainly not invisible or unimportant. I do not bring this up here because I
intend to discuss them. That’s a topic for another paper. My concern here is to examine why the
Hutu targeted the Tutsi specifically. Who are the Tutsi and who are the Hutu? Are they the same
people who, as a result of a social or political contract, assumed different identities? Practically
all of the literature on Rwanda have asked these questions. The population in Rwanda consists of
85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa (UN.org). Therefore, it should be uncontroversial that Hutu
and Tutsi are two different identities. I will explain this further below.
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When asked where the Hutu and Tutsi are from, most Hutus argue that Hutus are the
original Banyarwandans (people of Rwanda), and the Tutsis are nonindigenous herdsmen, who
migrated to Rwanda from Ethiopia in search of greener pasture for their cattle. Indeed, there are
recognizable physical differences between the three groups. Most Tutsis are taller, “with long
thin noses and lighter skin.” The Hutu is often shorter and stockier, with flat noses and very
black skin (Peterson 2000). The National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), a research
institute based in France, revealed that “Tutsi[s] are taller than the Hutu by nearly ten
centimeters” (Mamdani 2001). Many of the leaders that orchestrated the genocide buttressed this
argument and used it to fuel the hostility against the Tutsi. On the contrary, when asked the same
question, most Tutsis maintain that Hutus and Tutsis are all Rwandans.
Other theories about the differences between the two identities are even more interesting.
Some (Peterson 2000; Gourevitch 1998) buttress the notion that the difference between a Tutsi
and Hutu is fundamentally based on the number of cattle one owns. Any Rwandan with ten cows
or more is considered a Tutsi and anyone with less is considered a Hutu or Twa. Hutus were
mainly farmers and a majority of the Tutsi were cattlemen. But due to very devastating famines
in those early days, Hutu farmers were not reaping enough from what they sow and hence
generated little revenue, and Tutsis, who were well versed in the art of trade, accumulated a
relatively good amount of wealth. Subsequently, “Tutsi came to mean rich.” However, “Hutus
could become Tutsis in a special ceremony if they were wealthy enough, and Tutsis could fall
into poverty” (Peterson 2000). The debate on this issue remains unsettled, and probably never
will. As an individual of African descent, I can confidently say that trying to trace the real origin
of most African ethnic groups is almost impossible. This is mainly because obtaining accurate,
consistent information from societies whose genealogical history is orally passed on from one
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generation to another is almost impossible. The narrative tends to shift to reflect the outlook of
the person recounting it.
Nevertheless, a more convincing narrative, based on my conversations with Rwandans,
follows that a hunter-gathering society known as the Twa are the original occupants of the Great
Lakes. However, the group that identifies itself as Hutu today arrived in the Great Lakes area
somewhere around the 11th century (Keller 2014; Mamdani 2001). There is no known account of
resistance on the part of the Twa upon encountering the Hutu. Nonetheless, the agricultural
practices of the Hutu forced the Twa to move deeper into the mountainous regions, where they
form their own enclave. As noted above, the Twa were mostly hunters and gatherers, so when
the Hutu started clearing fields to farm on, the Twa’s way of life was significantly threatened.
Given their physical size (dwarf-like), they have a more pacific disposition, and as such decided
not to go to war with the Hutu over space. Instead, they made the choice to abandon their
occupied territories and move farther up the hilly regions. Their view of human nature is humble
and unassuming. Consequently, as the Twa continued their retreat in order to accommodate the
Hutu farmers, the majority of the regions started to fall under the control of the Hutu. However,
three centuries later a group of cattlemen (presumably from the eastern part of the continent)
started to slowly appear in the region in search of fresh savannahs for their cattle. That band of
herdsmen became the group that is identified today as the Tutsi.
Furthermore, it is important to note that before the advent of the Europeans and, despite
the obvious differences with respect to the time of arrival in the region and their way of life, the
initial encounter between the three groups was non-violent and benign. This resulted to the
sharing of the same language (Kiyarwanda), cultural practices, interethnic marriages, and
communities. Nevertheless, agriculture or subsistence farming was not a very reliable source of
9

food for the Hutu - given the poor and unconducive climate conditions in the region, so the Hutu
sometimes had to rely on the Tutsi for food supply. Consequently, the value and benefit of
owning cattle – one being a great source of food for a lengthy period – gave the Tutsi higher,
respectable statuses in society. Members of the community would go to those with higher titles
and status in the community (mostly Tutsi) and ask them to preside over disputes, counsel them
on a course of action to take on certain matters, and some even offered to work for free in
exchange for feeding their families. This is a common predisposition that we Africans have. We
tend to give high, unsought regards to people with wealth and knowledge. Although unintended,
by engaging in that trend, the Hutu were unknowingly surrendering themselves to the Tutsi as
subjects to be ruled. Over time, a Lord-Vassal type relationship developed between the Hutu and
Tutsi. The Lords tended to be Tutsi, but a very small number of Hutu assumed such roles, too.
The Hutu that became Chiefs or Lords were mostly those who acquired wealth and cattle by
virtue of serving under a Tutsi Chief, or rewarded for services provided to a Tutsi Title holder.
Notwithstanding, among the chiefs themselves were those who were wealthier and more
popular, leading to the formation of a traditional hierarchy - in which those with the most cattle
and notoriety held even higher positions and presided over the chiefs that ruled over various
communities. With this drift, Rwanda was on a fast track of becoming a Monarchy, with a very
effective hierarchical and governing system. At the helm of all things was the King or (Mwami) his name was Kigeri Rwabugiri – a Tutsi.

The Arrival of Europeans in the Great Lakes
After the vast African continent was divided up like a piece of pie among the Europeans
at the 1884 Berlin Conference (Adogame 2004), Rwanda became part of German’s East Africa.
But before the Germans took charge of Rwanda and later relinquished it to Belgium at the end of
10

WW1, the Rwandan Monarchy did not politicize the ethnic identities in the country; there were
no major tribal distinctions between the ethnic groups. King Rwabugiri ruled over all, including
the Tutsi. In fact, he embarked on a crusade that effectively established him as the central figure
in the entire region. Those who were against his rule, both Hutu and Tutsi – although very few –
were slaughtered by the King’s army. By the time the Europeans arrived, the region was under
the full control of the Tutsi Monarch.
The Germans were the first Europeans to arrive in the region in 1897 (Sagall 2013), and
they were surprised to find a well-organized centrally controlled society in the Great Lakes
region. At the same time, they were glad to have discovered such a well-established system of
governance; it was the perfect situation for them in furthering their imperial agenda. They
decided not to disrupt the current system. Instead, they immediately established a relationship
with King Rwabugiri, and subsequently initiated an effective system of indirect rule. They used
the King and the Tutsi chiefs as enforcement agents of their policies. The King, however, died
before the system of full collaboration and cooperation with the Germans was implemented,
leading to an internal struggle among the Tutsi chiefs for a successor (Keller 2014). The
Germans were utterly confused by the sudden disorderliness, which threatened their continued
control over the means of production and distribution of goods and services.
As a Consequence, the Germans decided to employ the use of military force in support of
the immediate Tutsi nobility who served under King Rwabugiri (Keller 2014). And so with the
unflinching support of the German military firepower, the Tutsi Nobles were able to effectively
crush their opposition and tighten their grip over their subjects. This marked the beginning of the
politicization of the ethnic groups in the region. The Germans did not want to have to experience
another disruption to their rule, so they declared the Tutsi as the rightful and only rulers. The few
11

Hutus that had held positions of authority were immediately removed and relegated to the status
of a Commoner. And with the assurance and the backing of the German military, Tutsi chiefs
began to treat their subjects, mostly Hutu, as slaves, sometimes with complete ruthlessness. Hutu
farmlands and properties were appropriated and given to the Tutsi. The Germans wanted to
prevent the Hutu from amassing wealth because with wealth comes power, and if enough Hutus
are able or allowed to secure that kind of influence, it could spell doom for the European-backed
Tutsi leadership (ibid).
Subsequently, starting from 1918, after Rwanda was relinquished to the Belgians as part
of a League of Nations mandate (UN.org), things went from bad to worse. In order to maintain
an effective indirect rule system, the Belgians abolished the use of the natural or original ethnic
differences between Hutu and Tutsi and invented a mechanism which made being Hutu or Tutsi
reflect one’s socioeconomic status. Those that were well-off were cast in the Tutsi class and the
poor or farmers were classified as Hutu (Keller 2014). Consequently, wealthy Hutus were made
Tutsi through a special ceremony and poor Tutsi fell to the ranks of Hutu. Additionally, in order
to effectively enforce this new system, the Belgians introduced a law requiring everyone to carry
an identification card, which would clearly show the class one belongs to. This highlights the
challenge that it is not always easy to tell who is a Tutsi and who is a Hutu based solely on
physical attributes. As a result, it would be plausible to argue that some Hutus may have been
indeed killed by their own people during the genocide because their Identification cards
identified them as Tutsi, when - in fact - they were Hutus who made the transition during the
Belgian administration. Of course, the deliberate and purposeful killing of Hutus by Hutus in
several instances during the genocide have occurred (Peterson 2000). The Hutu, like many ethnic
groups around the world, have differences and disagreements among themselves. But the point I
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am making here is the case of mistaken identity, where Hutus were slaughtered because their
Identification cards presented them as Tutsi.

The Rise of Extremism
The zealotry that caused the genocide was born out the 1959 revolution. Immediately
following the dismantling of the Tutsi monarchy by the Hutus, the leaders of the revolution
wanted to make sure their newly-found power was unchallenged and everlasting, so they made
sure not a single Tutsi was appointed or held a position in the new Hutu-led government.
However, not all of the leaders supported the idea to completely marginalize the Tutsi. The
promulgation of the plan to utterly relegate the Tutsi leadership caused the emergence of a drift
between Hutus from the north and those form the south (Hintjens 1999). Within the Hutu ethnic
group itself, those from north tend to hold lofty positions in government and the military. They
had better and higher education than their brethren in the south. Government employers, for the
most part, preferred northern Hutus to southerners. This is presumably due to the fact that the
percentage of mixed marriages in the country is higher in the south than in the north. The Hutu
northerners “considered themselves purer ethnically, and historically less subservient to the
Batutsi than the predominantly ‘mixed’ southerners” (ibid). As a result, some Hutus from the
south were deprived of the same privileges as Hutus from the north. To this end, the Hutus from
the south did not fully support the plot to entirely dismantle the Tutsi leadership. They feared
that if all the Tutsis were successfully banned from government and top military positions, Hutus
from the south were most likely going to be next.
As a consequence, a good number of the southern Hutus sided with the Tutsi-dominated
(RPF) rebel force and subsequent negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania to democratize the political
process (Kuperman 2014). Most of the Hutus who were targeted and killed during the genocide,
13

whom scholars and others refer to as “moderate,” were either from the southern region or
affiliates. They were considered “Tutsi sympathizers.” Conversely, the Hutus who decried the
negotiations and any form of integration of the Tutsi in government and the army were
subsequently classified as extremists (Mamdani 2001). Their views were too radical, and they
mostly favored exclusionist policies. They championed the birth of “Hutu Power,” the demand
for a Hutu nation. “The core of the ideology of Hutu Power was the conviction that the Tutsi
were a race alien to Rwanda, and not an indigenous [ethnic group]” (ibid). This visible
acrimonious relationship between the Hutu leaders from the south and those from the north
raged, so that factions started to emerge within the Hutu-dominated government.
In the early 1990s proponents of Hutu Power in top military and government positions
started to organize. They formed a fraternity named the Akazu (which means small/little/tiny
house) or ‘le clan de madame,’ pioneered (for the most part) by President Habyarimana’s own
wife (Agathe Habyarimana). Notwithstanding, it’s imperative to note that the former First Lady
continues to maintain that she is innocent; that she never led the Akazu. In a 2007 interview
published by the guardian newspaper, First Lady Agathe said this:
It's all lies. I deny the lot... These are inventions by the RPF. Long in advance, they
spread these lies to cover their own crimes. My role was to be the first lady. I was busy
looking after housekeeping and my husband. I also had charitable works. I used to visit
the elderly and I was patron of several orphanages that I used to visit. I was involved in a
women's sewing group. We went to the hospital with children's clothes. We tried to help
the unfortunate. Occasionally when my husband was travelling abroad, other first ladies
wanted me to come along, so I did.
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Nevertheless, the existence of the Akazu is no fiction. “[T]his group had tight control of over
President Habyarimana’s extensive networks of political patronage” (Hintjens 1999). The group
established and sponsored two propaganda agencies: the radio RTLM (Radio et Television
Libres des Mille Collines) and the Kangura – “Wake It Up” - newspaper (Mamdani 2001;
Hintjens 1999). According to members of the Akazu, the creation of these two institutions was a
response to the 1987 establishment of a newspaper company called Kanguka or “Wake Up,”
sponsored by a wealthy Tutsi businessman and headed by a Hutu from the South (Gourevitch
1998). The Kanguka was perceived by members of the Akazu as critical to president
Habyarimana’s administration. Subsequently, the “Hutu Ten Commandments” were published
by the Kangura. “The Ten Commandments forbade Hutu from entering into wide range of
relations with Tutsi, whether in sex, business, or state affairs” (Mamdani 2001). It was through
these institutions that the proponents of the Hutu Power expressed their outrage over the
negotiations going on in Arusha. Additionally, prominent members of the Hutu community were
interviewed by these two propaganda organs, in an effort to propagate and bolster their
legitimacy. Through these publications, the extremists encouraged the Hutu to “stop having
mercy on the Tutsi” (ibid). The radio played music that urged the Hutu masses to rise up and
“defend” their rights “against those who want to oppress [them],” the Tutsi.

Why Exterminate the Tutsi?
It is puzzling how people who speak the same language, go to the same schools, share
communities, and practice interethnic marriages could one day experience such shocking
interethnic violence. For centuries, societies that share the same cultural practices have attempted
to annihilate each other. Consider, for example, the American Civil War (1861 – 65), in which
620,000 lives perished (history.com). Other such devastating civil conflicts in Liberia, Sierra
15

Leon, Angola, and parts of Europe in which people that share the same community, language and
culture cost unimaginable havoc and death to each other. Yet, with so much knowledge and
experience to learn from these past violent events, we continue to be perplexed whenever there is
a breakout of similar events. The Rwandan genocide is one such event that people who witnessed
and others who hear what happened hitherto appear shocked and confused. Why? Perhaps I best
leave it to psychologists and other experts to figure that one out. My concern here is to attempt to
explain why the Hutu wanted to bring the extinction the Tutsi.
First and foremost, before I present my analysis, I cannot escape the impulse to describe
the extreme brutality with which the victims were killed. The killers did not just want the Tutsi to
disappear from existence, they want them to die in the most unimaginable ways. The sheer
ruthlessness with which the killers carried out their murderous plot should shock the conscience
of any human. Here is how one of the killers described his nature during the infamous Nyamata
church massacre: “It was as if we were taken over by Satan. We were taken over by Satan. When
Satan is using you, you lose your mind. We were not ourselves. Beginning with me, I don't think
I was normal” (BBC Panorama, 2004). Perhaps that would help explain this particular incident:
“[The] militias tied a woman named Innocent Mukadori and her child together and then thrust a
stick through her genitals until it came out through the head. After that they nailed the child on
her with another sharpened stick” (Kamau 2004). Such horror. Isn’t there such thing as morality,
even in killing? Why does it have to be so inhumane? I fail to understand the purpose it serves
killers when they subject their victims through horrendous pain, such as the example of the
mother and child above, before killing them. There was nothing humanly deficient about the
killers, such that they would give their victims the most painful death imaginable. In other words,
the killers were everyday humans, who had the capacity to reason; they knew right from wrong;
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they react the same way that any normal human would react when or after they witness a
traumatic event. A killer confirms this when he describes what seems to be a post traumatic
syndrome disorder:
I saw people whose hands had been amputated, those with no legs, and others with no
heads. I saw everything. Especially seeing people rolling around and screaming in
agony, with no arms, no legs. People died in very bad conditions [...]. You wouldn't be
normal if you start butchering people for no reason. We had been attacked by the devil.
Even when I dream my body changes in a way I cannot explain. These people were my
neighbors. The picture of their deaths may never leave me. Everything else I can get out
of my head but that picture never leaves (BBC Panorama, 2004).
Additionally, during the church massacre in Nyamata, women and children were forced to
choose between getting hacked to death or jumping into pit latrine. Seeing what the machete is
able to do, the victims chose the latter (Krivoushin 2014). So what accounts for such revulsion of
the Tutsi, so that they had to die in such callous manner?
The number of people killed and, the speed and effectiveness with which the perpetrators
carried out the extermination, suggests that a tremendous amount of sophisticated planning and
consideration was involved. Thus, the important question here is, why did the Hutu want to bring
the extinction of the Tutsi? To answer this question, a flashback at the colonial era is necessary.
As I noted above, it is out of colonialism that the political identities of Hutu and Tutsi were
established and radicalized. Under colonial rule, Tutsis found favor in the eyes of their “colonial
masters.” And the reason for this, according to Uvin (1997), was that the Germans and Belgians
(colonial masters) were convinced that Tutsis were “more intelligent, reliable, hardworking – in
short, more like themselves – than the Hutu,” and given that the Belgians and Germans measured
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themselves “superior” to the indigenous Rwandans, anyone like them must also be regarded
with, not necessarily equal, but high enough level of respect. Although Tutsis were not exalted to
the same status as their “white masters,” they were made superior to the indigenous Hutus. This
segregation marked the genesis of the political hostility that led to the bloodshed in 1994.
However, scholars like Uvin, Mamdani, and others - although not completely wrong about the
Belgians perpetrating the philosophy of Tutsi supremacy – did not consider the question of why
the colonial masters were inclined to stimulate and politicize the Tutsi ethnic identity. Most of
them only followed the narrative that the Belgians wanted to brand the Tutsi ethnic group as the
superior race in contrast to the Hutu. I argue that that approach only presents us with a historical
account of what transpired. It does not produce a critical analysis that helps us understand the
cause of the hatred that instigated the genocide. Therefore, we cannot continue to bolster that
justification when analyzing the cause(s) of the genocide. Instead, we ought to analyze the
question in a more rational sense.
First and foremost, it should be uncontentious that the notion that the Tutsis are superior
and more intelligent than Hutus, which is the justification that the colonialist gave to explain why
they favored the Tutsi over Hutus, is utterly absurd and unfounded (perhaps I am being too
“politically correct”). It is my conviction that the colonialists found it more expedient to maintain
the Tutsi authority that has ruled the people for decades instead of inverting it. Ordinarily,
colonialists have a predisposition of exerting their authority on indigenous people through a
system of indirect rule. Mamdani confirms this in the first chapter of his book, labeling Rwanda
as a “Halfway House.” He asserts that “Like elsewhere in colonial Africa, in Rwanda, too,
Belgian power constructed ‘customary law’ and ‘Native Authorities,’ alongside civic law
authorities.” Thus, I would argue that it was in their interest to ensure that the authority of the
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Tutsi leadership was not undermined, and hence concocted the preposterous supremacist
ideology and racialized the two groups to make sure that Hutus do not challenge the Tutsi.
Mamdani argues that “if the Tutsi were a [civilized race], then there would have to be institutions
that would discriminate in favor of the Tutsi so as to make the theory a reality.” For example,
Peterson (2000) recounts the following observations made by two colonialists: “The Watutsi are
a tall, well-made people with an almost ideal physique.” In contrast, the same observer noted that
the Hutus are “primitive inhabitants. They are a medium-sized type of people, whose ungainly
figures betoken hard toil, and who patiently bow themselves in abject bondage to the later
arrived yet ruling race, the watutsi.” The observer, a Belgian doctor, describes the Hutu as
“childish in nature, both timid and lazy, and as often as not, extremely dirty. They form the serf
class.” These kinds of dangerous misconceptions and stereotypes were propagated and ostensibly
proved very successful. Of course, this was pure propaganda: no different from the era of Nazi
Germany, when Hitler condemned and dehumanized anyone who does not possess certain
physical attributes, in an effort to maintain his construal of a supreme human race.
Additionally, the White colonialists wanted to ensure the “Tutsi Supremacy” ideology
was realized, so they built an educational and administrative system for the Tutsi. Mamdani
adds, “The creation of a school system that could act as a womb of racial ideology was a
priority.” Even later on when it was no longer possible to limit enrollment to the Tutsi, Tutsis
were offered higher, superior education, whereas the Hutu only gained basic education. In the
administrative sector, only the Tutsi were allowed to hold government positions. Thereupon, the
colonial masters started incorporating the Tutsi hierarchy into their power structure. As a result, a
greater number of the Tutsi were able to amass wealth and resources, such as cattle, farm land,
and better homes, at the expense of the Hutu class. The ID Cards, a quintessential part of the
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genocide, was part of the Belgians’ ploy to maintain the Tutsi Supremacy. However, it is
important to note forcefully here that the Belgians couldn’t have known that the ID Cards that
they have forced Rwandans to carry would facilitate the speedy extermination of the Tutsi years
after they left the country.
Nevertheless, as I noted above, the reason why the Belgians sided with the Tutsi was not
because Tutsis possess better human qualities or characteristics than the Hutu. It was all hoopla;
a convenient way to propagate and effectively administer their system of indirect rule. In fact, I
am convinced that if the Hutus were the ones in charge when the Europeans arrived, the
Europeans would have favored them over the Tutsi. I should not struggle to defend this
conviction; they proved my point during and immediately after the 1959 revolution, when they
abandoned the Tutsi leadership - a group they proclaimed to be superior - and embraced the new
Hutu elite, who, with Belgian help, completely dismantled the Tutsi monarchy and took control.
Nonetheless, in hindsight, the use of propaganda allowed the Belgians to outfit the Tutsi (when it
mattered) with the unimpeded authority, which the Tutsi elite also capitalized on and cast their
Hutu brethren into servitude. “The objective was to turn the Tutsi, the ‘born rulers of Rwanda,
into an elite ‘capable of understanding and implementing progress,’ and thus functioning as
auxiliaries to both the missionaries and the colonial administration” (Mamdani 2001).
Furthermore, it is imperative to consider and analyze the rationale behind the policies
implemented by the Europeans in colonial Rwanda. Many writers blame colonialist for the
troubles in the “dark continent,” and I concur to a certain extent, but we must take care not to be
too quick to blame colonialists and imperialism for all the violent events in Africa. For example,
Belgium did not invade Rwanda and forcefully take control of the small east African nation. Its
occupation of Rwanda was as a result of an internationally engineered, acceptable practice to buy
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or claim ownership of territories in the continent. Moreover, the Belgian’s occupation was
supported by a League of Nations mandate to establish control and rule over the people of
Rwanda (Keller 2014). The purpose of the mandate, it should be clear, was not to promote
colonialism. Instead, it was meant to create a pathway to independence. Thus, in the eyes of the
international community, there was no Rwanda; there was only the territory or colony of
Belgium, over which the Belgians have every right to govern however they see fit – provided
there was a plan to relinquish control to the Rwandans. But until such a time, Rwanda was part
of Belgium (technically speaking). Accordingly, the Belgians chose to use the human capital
(Rwandans) - in a land that they own and control - to extract its resources. Was it humane? No.
Was it within their right? Yes. Certainly, we cannot argue that the Belgians took control of
Rwanda for the sole purpose of destroying it or its people. The people were an integral part of its
economy, and it was in their interest to make sure the country was stable. We could, however,
criticize their lack of foresight and carelessness.
Against this background, the advent of severe economic crisis, caused by devastating
famines, in post-colonialism left many of the Hutus scrambling over what little food they could
find in order to survive, while most of the Tutsi had relatively enough food or resources to get
by. This is not to say, however, that Tutsis did not suffer from the famine, but, compared to the
Hutu, most Tutsi were economically secure, as generations before passed on wealth and
properties to their next of kin. Moreover, the majority of the population had little or no education
at all, so subsistence farming was one of the few options available for anyone (mainly Hutu) who
wishes to make a living. Again, a great number of the Tutsi were established farm owners and
mastered the art of trade (thanks to their colonial masters), so there was little concern for their
welfare, compared to the Hutu.
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Moreover, this problem was compounded by overpopulation. “Rwanda was the most
densely populated country in Africa – second in the world only to Bangladesh…” (Peterson
2001). No amount of farming could produce nearly enough to feed the nation. The soil grew
more and more infertile and overworked, due to the lack of a shifting cultivation system.
Basically, the country was experiencing incessant, devastating famines, which ushered in an
abysmal economic crisis. Consequently, Hutu extremists, upon comparing their welfare to the
Tutsi – amid the depression, concluded that the Tutsi experience of the depression was not as
severe as the Hutu. The “Hutu Power” and wealth that the Hutu extremists had envisioned after
the revolution had not materialized. Although Tutsis were also among the Rwandans enduring
the shattering effects of the famine, the Hutu (by virtue of consisting of mostly farmers) suffered
the most. Subsequently, the Hutu extremists – who had control over virtually all of the
government sectors following the revolution – formulated an ideology that prescribed the Tutsi
as the cause of the agony that Rwandan Hutus were experiencing. Successively, the extremists
called for the extermination of all Tutsis – a violent solution to end the devastation. They argued
that if the Tutsis were not eliminated, it would lead to the kind of dependency that ushered in the
Lord-Vassal relationship that existed between the two groups, half a century ago.

How the 1959 Revolution Caused the Genocide
In 1959 a band of Hutu elite drafted what they called the “Bahutu Manifesto,” which
demanded a double liberation of the Hutu from both the Tutsi monarchy and white colonialists.
During this time, however, a new breed of Belgian colonialists had also taken over from the
original “masters.” The new Belgian administration was more liberal-oriented and consisted of
mostly younger priests and administrators. As a result of this new development, more and more
Hutus started gaining unrestricted access to quality education and important administrative
22

duties, whereas the Tutsi Aristocracy started to decline rapidly. This is how the Hutu elite
emerged. It was “almost as if Belgian authorities had hit a switch – swept away the Tutsi
monarchy” (Peterson 2000).
In 1957 nine members of this new Hutu Elite (among them was a man who would
become president – Gregoire Hayibanda) greeted representatives from the League of Nations,
who arrived to inspect how the Belgian administration was governing the people, and presented
to them a document that they called the “Bahutu Manifesto.” The manifesto was a form of
complaint, in which the group articulated inhumane treatment of members of the Hutu ethnic
group by the Tutsi leadership, aided by the Belgian administration (Keller 2014). Furthermore in
the manifesto, the Hutu leaders decried the Tutsi ethnic group and labelled them as foreigners
who invaded the land of the Hutu and Twa (ibid). The Hutu elites called for the establishment of
a more democratic system of governance, in which the majority (Hutu) would assume control of
government. They also requested the departure from Rwanda all the colonialists.
When the Tutsi heard what the Hutu had done, they, too, wrote a document of
declaration: they called it “Mise au Point” (Statement of View). In their document they argued
that the problem in Rwanda is about race. Nevertheless, they also called for the departure of the
Europeans but, instead of introducing a majority rule, they argued that power must rest with the
Tutsi nobility, because they were the ones with the proper training to effectively govern the
people. The difference between the two documents is that: one (Hutu) wanted democracy and
independence, whereas the other (Tutsi) only wanted independence, not democracy. These
dissimilarities led to a cascade of violent events that precipitated the revolution, and forced the
Belgians to side with the Hutu (majority).
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Nonetheless, this metamorphosis should not be misunderstood as the Belgians suddenly
wanting to introduce a more reasonable system of governance, where the will of the majority is
at play. Far from that. Despite their lack of foresight and ineffective leadership, the Belgians
masters were very smart: they were quick to recognize the change in the dynamics of the society,
and the emerging Hutu elite - as a result of the education they were receiving – so they decided
to switch allegiance and focus their attention to the promotion and advancement of the Hutu
class.
Consequently, the transition was accompanied by a series of politically-inspired violence
against leaders of the Tutsi minority, which steered the forceful transfer and dismantling of Tutsi
power at the administrative level. Hundreds of Tutsi were slaughtered and their houses and farms
burnt down. Thousands of others were forced to flee Rwanda to neighboring Burundi, Uganda,
and Zaire (now DR Congo). This political change served as a stimulus for the advent of Hutu
extremism. The political system was utterly inverted. The Hutu were now at the helm of
everything political; they had absolute control. The Tutsis were systematically targeted and
brutalized. Politically and socially, The Tutsi were devalued and perceived as worthless. They
were denied access to any form of political influence and forbidden from forming any political
party. (Mamdani 2001) One very important characteristic of the 1959 revolution that solidified
the Hutu Supremacy is the overthrow of the Monarchy and replacing it with a “republican”
system of governance. Nonetheless, tensions continued to mount, and the Belgians, realizing
how quickly they were losing power, decided to organize elections. The Hutu party, Party of the
Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARAMEHUTU), won 78% of the votes, and the Tutsi party –
Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) – lost with 22% (Keller 2014). This First Republic was
born.

24

The First Republic
After the elections a small Hutu elite was effectively placed atop the political power
structure. The new Hutu elite immediately classified the Tutsi as non-citizens. The new president
(Kayibandi), however, wanted to include the Tutsis and reconcile, but he was under interminable
pressure from Hutu hardliners to eliminate all the Tutsi and establish a Hutu nation (ibid). Thus,
in order to establish a strong presence and ensure absolute control of the country, the new
government developed a very sophisticated system of administration. It made sure it was
represented even at the lowest levels of the postcolonial society; it adopted and effectively
enforced a policy of systematic, institutionalized discrimination of the Tutsi. It introduced a
quota system “that limited access to higher education and state jobs” to a number proportional to
the Tutsi populace (Uvin 1997). Another very important legacy of the First Republic is the
continuation of the identity cards introduced by the colonial masters, which was very useful from the killers’ perspective – in identifying the Tutsis once the massacre began.
Notwithstanding, president Kayibandi was still reluctant to implement the extremists’
plan to annihilate the Tutsi and establish a Hutu nation, effectively marking himself as a
moderate Hutu. President Kayibandi was from the center of the country and the hardliners were
mainly from Northern part of the country. This is perhaps what accounts for the ideological
differences. Arguably, because the president was not from the north, he did not share the radical
views that the extremists from the north espoused. As a result, the hardliners were not too
pleased with the president’s refusal to get on board with their immoderate plans and ideologies.
Therefore, the president and his administration became the central focus of extremist,
antigovernment rhetoric.
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The opposition became so intense that the president himself feared for his life, leading
him to a state of constant paranoia. Subsequently, the president created a secret police force to
protect him; to investigate and weed out anyone suspected to be a threat to the administration
(Keller 2014).This proactive, self-defense move instilled a great sense of insecurity in the Hutu
extremists - and even the Tutsi, who didn’t seem to share his paranoia (ibid). Consequently, most
of the Tutsi fled the country, and the Hutu started to devise a plan to remove him.

The Second Republic
The extremists’ plan to dethrone the moderate Hutu leader was initiated and executed on
July 5, 1973, when an army Major General named Juvenal Habyarimana ousted him in a
bloodless coup (Keller 2014). Habyarimana was from the northeastern part of the country.
Nevertheless, president Habyarimana’s priorities were not in alignment with that of the
hardliners. His first decree as president was a guarantee of safety for all the Tutsi in the country,
and declared himself protector of “all children” of Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi (ibid). This
declaration was both shocking and gut-wrenching to the hardliners, but the Tutsi welcomed the
news – with a reasonable level of apprehension, of course.
Habyarimana’s policies turned out to be even more moderate than his predecessor’s. He
eradicated almost all of the anti-Tutsi policies put in place by the preceding administration,
especially the policies that perpetuated the assumptions that the Tutsi belong to a different race.
All the Tutsi in the country at the time were recognized as citizens. Of course, external pressure
did play a role in this metamorphosis. I will elucidate the role that the international community
played in this process subsequently. The president, however, refused to accept the repatriation of
the Tutsi that were forced to flee Rwanda during the era of the First Republic. He insisted that
the country was “full up,” thus any Tutsi who fled the country should settle wherever they are
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(Keller 2014). Of course, this was a calculated attempt by him to prevent the expansion of the
Tutsi population in the country.
Notwithstanding, the drastic changes that the president was making were still not enough
to ease the suffering of the Tutsi in the country. They were still marginalized. Not a single Tutsi
was elected even at the lowest political office. Education was limited: only 9% admission quota
was accorded to the Tutsi (ibid). Life was still unbearable for the Tutsi in the country. The only
positive thing that was happening to them at that time was the fact that there were no mass
killing campaigns of the Tutsi by the hardliners.
In theory, president Habyariman’s policies reflected a progressive and reasonable level of
seriousness on his part in unifying the country. Nonetheless, not all of his policies were geared
towards serving the interest of the entire country, and democratization. For example, he outlawed
all opposition parties in the country and introduced a One-Party rule, one that he himself created
and named it the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND). Membership in
this party requires the acceptance and maintenance of very lofty standards of respect and
discipline. Members were expected to conduct themselves with the highest level of dignity and
appearance, and the people they spend time with must also possess similar mannerism (Keller
2014).
However, despite president Habyarimana’s efforts to maintain dictatorial rule over the
country, he could not escape the influence and reach of the hardliners – especially the Akazu. The
Akazu, as I noted above, was headed by the president’s own wife - proceeded to become the most
fundamental organ that perpetrated the genocide and killing of the Tutsi (Peterson 2000). The
group was the most influential radical anti-Tutsi group, with connections and spies embedded
within the president’s own administration. It heralded the extinction of the Tutsi group, and
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arranged for the formation of different militant groups around the country, to be trained and
armed ready for the holocaust that was to come. It was around this time that the Second Republic
began to unravel drastically, causing the emergence of extremist factions, and serious mistrust
within the Hutu leadership itself. After taking over from the oppressive regime of the First
Republic, the Second Republic’s tyrannical nature piloted renewed violence directed toward the
Tutsi. Thus, by 1964, the atmosphere in Rwanda had become too agonizing for the Tutsi. It is
estimated that between “270,000 and 370,000 had fled Rwanda” (UN.org). Mamdani (2001)
argues that the “Second Republic’s greatest failure was that it was unable to even pose the
question of how to integrate the Tutsi diaspora with the postcolonial polity.”
The president’s efforts to maintain control were further paralyzed by the fickleness of the
world’s market economy. Rwanda’s main export goods are coffee and tin, so when the prices for
these goods significantly dipped, Rwanda’s economy was severely crippled. Moreover, around
the same time, international donors started to make strong demands for democracy, and
conditional economic assistance were implemented. Towards the end of 1980, pressure within
and outside the country, in the form of the Arusha Accord, increased exponentially, challenging
the president to implement policies to end the corruption and democratize the political system.
The donors used the economic crisis as a vehicle to demand full cooperation from the President.
And, as if these demands were not challenging enough for the president, the Tutsi rebel force
(RPF) invaded in October 1990.

The Emergence of the RPF
A whole generation had passed since the revolution that forced thousands of Tutsis to flee
Rwanda. As I have stated above, most of the refugees crossed into Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi,
where they, again, endured political violence – mostly in Uganda and Zaire (Peterson 2000). The
28

natives in those countries saw their presence there as a threat to their prosperity, because the
Tutsi refugees were mostly preferred by government employers and some private institutions due to their aptitude as intellectuals (Mamdani 2001). And just like the anti-Tutsi crusade that
forced them out of Rwanda, Tutsis found themselves once again having to fight to survive in
foreign lands. Consequently, a guerrilla rebel force, that called itself “Inyenzi” (cockroaches),
was formed by the Tutsi to forcefully repatriate back into Rwanda (Kuperman 2004). Many
commend the RPF for ending the slaughter. I, too, agree with that conclusion, but my argument
here reveals that without the RPF invasion, the genocide would not have taken place. In other
words, the actions of the RPF precipitated the genocide, but at the same time helped to end the
bloodshed once the killing started.
They started by launching guerrilla-style attacks on the Hutu government in Rwanda
from Uganda. These subsequent small-scaled yet devastating attacks gave impetus to the Hutu
extremism born out of the revolution. The Hutus immediately formulated a propaganda intended
to pit the Hutus against the Tutsis. They organized large gatherings throughout the country, in
which they gave powerful speeches in an attempt to justify the preservation of the Hutu power,
and why the extermination of all the Tutsis was obligatory. Most of their justifications were
predicated on the unverifiable claim that the Tutsi are not Rwandans: they are aliens, and must
never be allowed back into Rwanda. Hintjens (1999) states that “a key speech was made in 1992
by a leading Hutu power politician… who heralded the genocide when he said that all Tutsi
should be sent ‘back home to Ethiopia’ where they supposedly came from.” This hateful
campaign raged and, ostensibly, proved successful. This was when the “Hutu Ten
Commandments” was published, effectively condemned any form of relations with the Tutsis.
Anyone caught having contact with Tutsis was charged with Treason (Peterson 2000).
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According to the tenth commandment, Peterson adds, it was the duty of every Hutu to
“spread widely the supremacist Hutu Ideology.” Another very effective mechanism that the
extremists employed to proliferate the Hutu Supremacist ideology was the use of private as well
as government-sponsored radio and television services. It was through these frequencies that
Tutsi names and addresses were broadcast to the public as targets to be eliminated. The most
notorious of these was the Radio Television Libre des Mille Collins (1,000 Hills Free Radio,
RTLM). From the highest political office, with authority to command the army, to the village
elder – with the influence over local armed groups, the extremists made sure the directives on
how to implement the slaughter were clear (Desforges 1999).
At this stage, all preparations for genocide were set; the country was ready for the horror
to come - waiting only for the trigger to be pulled. And surely enough that trigger sound happens
to come in the form of the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990. One might ask, how did the RPF
invasion provoke the Hutu extremist groups to the extent that they believed it necessary to
launch their “final solution:” the massacre? The answer is simple: Although political tensions
were already at a zenith, with extremist rhetoric consistently alluding to genocide, there really
wasn’t enough rationale to start the killings until the RPF invasion. The invasion gave the
extremists impetus to propagate the call to go out and kill. Through the extremist-sponsored
radios in the country, the Hutus were brainwashed into fearing their Tutsi neighbors. In an
interview with the BBC, a killer explains how the perpetrators use the radio: they would say
“that the rebels, the cockroaches, are now the RPF, and that they are all Tutsis. That is when the
hatred started and when you met a Tutsi you would say it’s your relatives who are trying to kill
us” (BBC Panorama, 2004).
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The three-year war between the Hutu government and the RPF decimated the Rwandan
society. Several hundred thousand lives (both Hutu and Tutsi) were destroyed. The extremists
embraced this devastation to incite and direct hatred towards the RPF and all the Tutsi in the
country. “The [RPF] invasion served the interests of the regime by increasing its legitimacy, and
large parts of the population rallied around it” (Uvin 1997).
The first RPF invasion took place on the first day of October 1990. The Rwandan Army,
however, was able to repel that invasion and destroy the rebel force. Subsequent attacks by the
RPF met the same fate. All but one of the commanding officers of the invasion were killed. His
name is Paul Kagame, and is today the President of Rwanda. Part of the reason for these
devastating losses was as a result of the international military support that the Rwandan
government forces were receiving, particularly from France, South Africa, and Belgium.
Consequently, Paul Kagame, the only surviving leader of the RPF, who was in the United
States for military training at the time of the initial invasion, cut his training short and returned
home to take command of the beleaguered rebel force. And it was under his leadership and
knowledge in the art of war that the RPF reconvened; commenced training in modern warfare in
earnest, while simultaneously launching demoralizing attacks on key Rwandan army barracks. A
former Hutu government soldier describes the tenacity of the RPF in an interview:
“It was as if they were completely possessed by evil spirits. Nothing we do could stop them. And
they always seem to know our next move before we even think it. Its craziness. It wasn’t normal.”
The French-trained and well-armed Rwandan army was being overrun with every
attack. Notwithstanding, with every defeat in the battlefield, the Rwandan army made sure that
Tutsi civilians paid the price. They accuse the Tutsi civilians of colluding with the enemy. And

31

thus thousands of Tutsi civilians in the southern region were killed in retaliatory attacks by the
Rwandan army (Kuperman 2004). Conversely, as the RPF was carrying out its final assault in
1994 to seize Kigali (the capital), many villagers and communities (mostly Hutu) directly in its
path abandoned their homes and villages and migrated to the inner cities. Some journalists
attached to the RPF or following its movement described the villages upon arrival as “eerily
calm.” According to Mamdani, Gerard Prunier, one of the famous writers who documented the
war in Rwanda, described the villages as empty of life, and added that “the RPF soldiers had not
looted anything and houses could be seen with chairs still set around a table and moldy food on
the plates where people had fled so hurriedly as not to eat their last meal.” The exact number of
people displaced is unknown, but a conservative estimate holds that up to 900,000 were
displaced from 1990-94 (Mamdani 2001). As a result, Hutu extremists, seeing how livid the
displaced population was, used it as a recruiting tool to ramp up their campaign and rhetoric,
convincing the Hutu population that the only solution to this problem is the extinction of the
Tutsi – who they accused of supporting the RPF. The displaced Hutus were promised that they
would repossess their properties back, and authorized to claim Tutsi properties - if they agree to
participate in the killing. This is one of the possible explanations of the unprecedented number of
participants in the butchery. Before the invasion, for example, the Rwandan army only consisted
of about 5,000 troops, but just a few weeks after the RPF invaded, that number was estimated to
reach about 24,000 (Peterson 2001).
However, even with the huge spike in the number of conscriptions the government forces
were unable to fend off the unwavering rebel force. As a result, realizing how successful its
campaign was going and, how the Rwandan army was being demolished with every advance, the
RPF made several demands, insisting that President Habyarimana and his government must meet
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if he wants to avoid being dethroned. These demands were made under the auspices of the UN
and other regional bodies, who have been working with both sides in Arusha, Tanzania to
negotiate a ceasefire. The outcome of that convention is what is officially known today as the
Arusha Accord, an agreement, signed by both parties. The most significant demands that the RPF
made in that agreement were:


All Rwandan refugees (mostly Tutsi) who fled the state during and after the revolution be
permitted to peacefully repatriate and reintegrated into the Rwandan society.



The Habyarimana government must fully implement the rule of law, democratization,
power sharing, and the creation of a unified military.

Kuperman (2004) asserts that “following the RPF’s dramatic display of strength… Habyarimana
soon conceded to virtually all of the rebels’… demands.” But those concessions almost
immediately exacerbated the political tensions in Kigali between the government and the
extremist factions, who made several desperate attempts to sabotage the Arusha convention. A
Tutsi representative at the negotiations recalled, during an interview, one of the government
representatives being “completely unreasonable: he was saying no to almost everything.” As a
result, president Habyarimana was confronted with two tough options: (i) implement the agreed
policies, which would undoubtedly ensure his removal from power by the extremists, or (ii)
refuse to implement the terms and risk being destroyed along with his army by the RPF. But
president Habyarimana’s ostensible ambivalence led both sides to question his commitment - to
the extent neither side trusted him. As a result, he was no longer considered pertinent by both
sides to achieving their respective goals. The RPF leadership accused him of deliberately
delaying the implementation of the agreed changes, and the extremists found his unwillingness to
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outright refuse the terms disconcerting. This is also what makes it difficult to definitively say
who shot down his plane.
Accordingly, the last RPF invasion in 1993 coincided with a political upheaval in Kigali,
and the climax of an intense anti-Tutsi campaign. As I have noted above, there was disunion
within the Hutu political leadership, between those who wanted the president to accept the terms
promulgated by the Tutsi rebels and those who were pushing for the exact reverse. There were
some who wanted to integrate the Tutsi in the political power structure, and others who viewed
any form of integration as coming to terms with the notion that the “Tutsi were as much a part of
the Rwandan political community as were the Hutu” (Mamdani 2001).
Against this background, Hutu extremists embarked on a publicity campaign, urging
Hutus not to support any form of integration of the Tutsi into the political sphere. They instill
fear and anxiety within the Hutu community, by warning them of the return to subjugation if the
Tutsis were ever allowed to hold onto any form of power. It is also during this period that the
formation of the militia, such as the “interahamwe” (those who stand/work/fight together) - an
armed civilian defense force - began in earnest. This crusade was so successful that when the
RPF eventually invaded in 1993, the Hutu leadership was able to convince the Hutus in Rwanda
that the invasion was the Tutsi’s attempt to forcefully take over power, and urged them to go out
and fight for their security, their survival, and for their country. From influential community
elders to religious leaders to youth representatives, all were forced to encourage their members to
partake in this “noble course.” And virtually all of them listened or were forced to comply.
Nevertheless, when the Rwandan army, with all the support and training it was getting,
shockingly failed to repel or halt the advancing RPF and, with defeat looming on the horizon,
extremists in top government positions sounded the alarm to commence implementation of the
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plan that they have carefully crafted: the annihilation of the Tutsis in Rwanda. Together with
various armed Hutu civilian defense forces around the country, the Rwandan army, in its quest to
ensure that the Tutsis never hold onto power – effectively started eliminating Tutsis and those
who sympathize with them, just minutes after the President’s plane was shot down – killing the
president and everyone on board, including the president of Burundi.
The Presidential Guards set up barricades on major highways, including the main route to
the airport, and began stopping vehicles and asking the occupants to present their identifications,
which – at that time – indicated the ethnic group one belongs to. Tutsis – men, women, and
children - were forced out of cars and instantaneously shot or hacked to death, after their IDs
confirmed who they were. In the rural areas, the militia, trained by the army and equipped with
whatever they could use to bleed Tutsis to death or break their skulls – mostly machetes - went
house to house, pulling families out of their homes and slowly decapitate them (Desforges 1999).
Most women were brutishly raped before being hacked to death; children were thrown against
walls and trampled upon; and men were butchered. The speed and efficiency of the butchery
were unprecedented. Consider, for example, this assessment by Scott Peterson, who documented
the genocide in his book, Me Against My Brother:
A mathematical calculation of Rwanda’s national suicide makes the speed of any other
recorded catastrophe or single act of war pale by comparison. The two atomic bombs
dropped upon the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed 200,000 people. The
toll of the entire four-year war between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in the former
Yugoslavia during the early 1990s also just topped 200,000…No system of genocide ever
devised has been more efficient. The daily kill rate was five times that of the Nazi death
camps.
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Yet, this is not to say that the death toll in Rwanda tops all conflict-related deaths in recorded
history. By the time Germany’s Third Reich was dismantled, over Six million Jews had been
exterminated. My intent is to demonstrate the sophistication of the plan and ferociousness of the
killing by the perpetrators in Rwanda.
What I have demonstrated in the above sections of this paper is the ways in which the
genocide was precipitated. The purpose is not necessarily to tell what happened but, instead, to
create a framework to help develop and provide and understanding of the cause of the genocide.
Identifying the cause is only a part of the bigger picture, which is what a significant part of the
extant literature on this topic is about. I have taken this further: I provided a critical analysis of
the cause of the genocide, examining the causal effects and how they triggered the genocide. The
genocide was not a spontaneous outburst of hatred and violence. In the early days of Rwanda,
before the coming of the Europeans, the people lived in relative peace and harmony. Their
differences notwithstanding, they tolerated and accepted one another. Peterson recalled an
interview he had with a Hutu in the aftermath, in which the individual confessed that, the idea
that a Rwandan would use a machete to kill another Rwandan is strange and it is not the way
Rwandans handle their problems. If Rwandans want to kill someone, the man claims, they use
poison, not a machete (Peterson 2000). A confluence of several factors precipitated the genocide,
and only by conducting a critical analysis of these factors and having a strong understanding of
them can we, maybe, prevent another massacre somewhere else.
In the next section, I will discuss the intervention, or lack thereof, of the international
community. My analysis will be incomplete if I do not discuss this here. Thus, in what follows, I
shall consider the involvement of the international community in Rwanda from the beginning of
the conflict, and how it failed to prevent the advent of the slaughter.
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International Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect
It has essentially become a taboo to discuss the Rwanda genocide without making
emphasis on how the international community failed to save the lives of the victims.” Many
blame the US and the UN for not doing enough to stop the massacre. Indeed the UN’s Secretary
General at the time, Boutros Boutros Ghali and, then Director of Peacekeeping Operations Kofi
Annan, have publicly confessed that the UN could have done more to end the senseless killing.
Annan asserted in 1998 that ‘state frontiers should no longer be seen as watertight protection for
war criminals or mass murderers’ (Krain 2005). Upon visiting Rwanda after the genocide,
President Bill Clinton also acknowledged that the US made a mistake by refusing to prescribe
the conflict as genocide. Belgium, France, Germany, England, among others, have all expressed
regret for the epic failure. There is plenty of blame to go around. Many regrettable mistakes were
made. The most egregious of which is the refusal of the United Nations to reinforce instead of
pulling out the troops at the most vital moment, when their presence could have curbed the
civilian death toll.
Before I delve deeper into my analysis of the international community’s action (or
inaction) in Rwanda, it is imperative to first consider the reasons that gave many, like me, cause
to blame the UN. In 1948, after Hitler and his murderous Nazi party succeeded in exterminating
12 million people, global leaders came together and asked themselves how such a holocaust
could have happened right under their noses. For this reason, world leaders, under the auspices of
the United Nations, decided to adopt the Genocide Convention. The fundamental purpose of this
convention is to prevent and punish crimes of genocide (Sarkin 2009). As a result, a famous
phrase emerged during and after the convention to reflect the leaders’ resolve to prevent such
heinous crimes against humanity from ever happening, “never again” (Mills 2015). Adopted by
37

United Nation Resolution 260 (III), Article 2 of the convention holds that “…genocide
means…acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group…”
Notwithstanding, within 70 years of the adoption of this acclaimed resolution, almost 50
incidents of genocide have taken place around the world (Sarkin 2009). From Europe to the
Middle East to Africa, Asia, and South and Central America; these regions have all endured and still do – events tantamount to genocide. This is evidence that the international community
and the United Nations as an institution, charged with the responsibility of preventing these
crimes from happening, did not uphold their commitment to the United Nations’ resolution 206,
and millions of people have paid the price with their lives as a result. Of course, the United
Nations and individual states have indeed intervened in conflicts around the world, in an attempt
to stop senseless killings of innocent civilians caught in the crossfire.
However, even in such cases where the United Nations has intervened, its capacity and
involvement is always limited due to very narrow, ambiguous and abstruse mandates. Today the
United Nations is involved, one way or another, in almost every conflict around the world.
Therefore, the issue is not so much about the failure to intervene; it is fundamentally a question
of competency and efficiency. For example, the United Nations was involved in Rwanda almost
three decades before the genocide, but it still wasn’t able to prevent the holocaust. This is why
many still blame the United Nations for the loss of civilian lives. How could it not have
foreknown what was going to happen? Perhaps an examination of the UN intervention before the
genocide is necessary. It is important to note here that the African Union was also actively
involved in the ceasefire negotiations. The use of the UN here is meant to represent the efforts by
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the two organizations to pacify the combatants. This is due to the fact that the African Union, for
the most part, has to get authorization from the UN before any intervention.

Pre-genocide UN Intervention
The international community, under the rubric of the League of Nations, has been
involved in Rwanda since its Transition from a German colony to a Belgian “Trusteeship.” But
for the purpose of this study, I am only going to focus on the UN intervention from 1992-1994.
Following the outbreak of the civil war between the RPF rebel force and the Rwandan National
Army in 1990 (I will discuss this more in detail later), several ceasefire negotiations were
arranged, as in most civil wars, to reconcile the warring parties. Subsequently, in 1993 the UN
Security Council passed resolution 846, which authorized the establishment of the United
Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). The purpose of this mission was to
ensure the peaceful and successful completion of the ceasefire negotiations. Both parties were
under pressure to fix their minds to purpose and quickly reach a comprehensive peace
agreement.
On March 16, 1993 the UN Secretary General appointed a representative to lead the UN
supervision of the negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania. The negotiation in Arusha had been under
the patronage of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). However, due to the lack of adequate
resources to facilitate its mission, the OAU requested that the UN take over responsibility of the
security force. The force was deployed after a request made by the parties to the UN to send a
security team immediately following the signing of an agreement. The mandate of the force was
to ensure the following: public safety, facilitate the uninterrupted delivery of humanitarian aid,
conduct search and seizures operations of weapons caches, disband any armed elements seeking
to compromise the deal, and demilitarize any militant extremist group (un.org).
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Part of the agreement also included the formation a new single unified Rwanda National
Army, which comprise of members of both the RPF and Rwandan Army. On August 4th, 1993
the convention in Arusha formally ended. However, the successful conclusion of the Arusha
negotiations meant further involvement of the UN. As part of the deal, The UN Security Council
was required to establish a new mission specific to Rwanda, to ensure the implementation of the
agreed terms and realization of the transition government. To this end, the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was effectively established in Rwanda on October
5th, 1993. The main objective of the mission was to investigate non-compliance with the terms of
the agreement, and ensuring the amicable repatriation of the refugees who fled the country when
the violence erupted. According to a UN report, one of the fundamental functions of UNAMIR
was to “monitor the security situation during the final period… leading up to elections.”
Resolution 872 allowed UNAMIR to stay in effect until October 1995, after the successful
implementation of elections and the new transitional government. The UN Security Council
further authorized the deployment of a contingent in Kigali to lay the groundwork for the
creation and implementation of the necessary institutions to ensure the smooth transition to the
new government.
The commentary above reveals how involved the UN has been in Rwanda before the
genocide. It was there to monitor and ensure the cessation of all hostilities and the transition to a
new government, which should have effectively ended the conflict between the government and
rebels. I find it imperative to emphasize this point here to prove that there was no way the UN
could have missed the signs of escalation in the conflict that could lead to genocide. Any action
taken by the two parties that was contrary to the Arusha accord was carefully scrutinized by the
UN team on the ground. A day before the genocide began in earnest, on April 5, 1994, out of
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serious concerns for the growing tensions and violent rhetoric against the Tutsi, the Security
Council passed another resolution (909) to extend the mandate of UNAMIR. But it was already
too late. The following day, on April 6, the President was assassinated on his way back from a
peace talk, triggering the commencement of the slaughter.

Logical Explanations of Why Intervention Failed
In this section, I am going to attempt to present some logical explanations which I believe
might have paralyzed the international community’s intervention efforts. Nonetheless, it is
important that these explanations not be viewed as excuses for inaction. Rather, they are meant
to serve as rational analysis, from a political standpoint, with respect to the epic failure of the
international community to save the lives of the civilians who died.
To this end, while I, too, strongly condemn the international community, not just one
particular state, individual or organization for ignoring the warning signs, I believe, however,
that 21 years of castigation and condemnation, which strongly and categorically expresses the
world’s resolve to never let an event like that occur, is more than enough to make that point. It is
pointless to continue to blame world leaders, without holding them to account, for failing to do
more. Besides, almost all of the leaders that were in charge at that time no longer hold any
meaningful position in the context of world politics. What we need to do now is to critically
examine the factors that may have prevented those leaders from acting, and work hard to create
new ways to avoid repeating the same mistakes. Subsequently, I am going to argue how
government-sanctioned killings, such as the Rwanda genocide, could effectively be prevented.
My main argument is that military intervention in government killing is the most effective means
to curtail civilian death toll. But first, I shall consider why intervention failed in Rwanda.
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In 2005, the 20th century international community adopted a new mantra in the field of
international relation, which it aptly defined as the “Responsibility to Protect or R2P,” with the
hope that it would serve as a motivation as wells as justification to intervene in ongoing conflicts
to protect civilian lives. The introduction of this concept was as a result of the failure to
efficiently intervene in Rwanda. The provision holds that:
[T]he individual governments promised to do their utmost to protect and prevent their
populations from atrocities that can be categorized as genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing or crimes against humanity. These are the broad pillars of focus, when talking
of the R2P concept and when and how to act in case of atrocities being committed.
It further notes that:
In cases where there is a need for the international community to mobilize collective
action and act in accordance with the R2P, it is a criterion that any involvement in a
crisis does not take place without a UN mandate to confer legitimacy. That is an
important element in the concept of R2P, in part to prevent states from exploiting the R2P
concept as a convenient political tool that could be used as justification for an
intervention.
Yet, around the world civilians continue to endure ceaseless persecutions by their
governments. The most recent examples of these include Syria, Ivory Coast, and the Central
African Republic. Still, none of these conflicts compare to the carnage that unfolded under the
very nose of the international community in Rwanda. The genocide in Rwanda, as I have shown,
is one of the most sophisticated and efficient government-sanctioned killing that the world has
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ever witnessed. This was made possible fundamentally due to the failure of the international
community to take necessary measures to curb the killing.
However, before the advent of R2P, “Never Again” was the motto that the international
community came up with to prevent conflicts like the genocide in Rwanda from happening.
Clearly this was a complete failure. Thus, in order to understand why the international
community failed, I will now examine the factors that I believe paralyzed the international
community from taking actions that could have prevented the deaths of thousands of civilians.
Then later I will present my argument on how to discourage the implementation of government
policies to exterminate civilians. The comment here is that two very important factors
contributed to the United Nations and United States’ response, or lack thereof, to the Rwandan
genocide: (1) Rwanda’s history of violence, and (2) the devastating consequences of the
intervention in Somalia.
Rwanda’s History of Violence
I cannot stress enough how important it is to recognize that, just like in most countries in
Africa, Rwanda has been engulfed in violent politically motivated conflicts well before the
revolution in 1959. The genocide was not a spontaneous outburst of hostility; it was an attempt
to execute a final solution to long and spread out hostilities that have existed between the Hutus
and Tutsis for over half a century. For example, the United Nation has been involved in
Rwanda, though only in observer capacity, since the early 60s, trying to repair the relationship
between the two groups. A report released in 1961 by the UN – after the Hutu revolution warned that “The developments of these 18 months have brought about the racial dictatorship of
one party.” The report added that “It is quite possible that some day we will witness violent
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reaction on the part of the Tutsis” (Peterson 2001). And like a prophecy, that “violent reaction”
that the UN report presaged came to pass in the form of the RPF invasion in 1990.
When the civil war broke out, many civilian lives were lost. As I have indicated above,
Tutsis were systematically targeted in retaliatory attacks by the Hutu government, with every
advance or attack by the Tutsi-dominated RPF. This was a tactical move by government forces to
discourage the Tutsi rebels from advancing any further, but the strategy did not seem to have
worked, because the rebels continued to advance and eventually took control of the capital.
Subsequent ceasefire deals were routinely broken by the actions of both sides during the civil
war. The demilitarized zone that the UN created was also violated multiple times, and civilian
lives were lost in almost all of those times. Most of these violent events were reported by the
international media, so that anyone who followed the news during this period very likely heard
or saw one or two things about the conflict in Rwanda. Furthermore, one week before the
president’s plane was shot down and the genocide began in earnest, heavy fighting broke out
between RPF soldiers stationed in Kigali, as part of the Arusha deal, and the Rwandan army
(Peterson 201).
Against this background, it is not at all unreasonable for the UN to initially assume that
the genocide that followed a week after the fierce battle in Kigali was just one of the series of onagain-off-again violent fighting that have ravaged the country for a very long time. Again, I must
reiterate that the speed with which the perpetrators carried out the killing was unparalleled.
Peterson argues that “Unless you had been a very close observer of Rwanda before the genocide,
in those days it was not clear what was happening, nor how organized it was.” In the first two
months of the genocide, the daily death rate was said to have reached 45,000. “One murder was
committed every 2 seconds of every minute, of every hour, for days…” (Peterson 2001). As a
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result and, with that kind of speed, one could discern – to some significant level – how the UN
and the international community could have had a hard time arriving at the conclusion that it was
genocide, and not the usual breakout of violent conflicts, that was happening. Remember,
according to the genocide convention, genocide is the systematic targeting and killing, maiming,
or injuring of a people belonging to a particular group. Consequently, the civilian deaths during
the genocide could easily be mistaken as “collateral damage,” in a war between the rebels and
government forces.
Moreover, it is imperative to bear in mind that, although UN observers and peacekeeping
troops were present in Rwanda when the genocide started and, were transmitting information to
headquarters about activities consistent with plans for a mass extermination, the UN is governed
and operated through a bureaucratic process. There are protocols that need to be followed in
reporting conflicts to the Secretariat, which then has to process the authenticity of the
information that it is receiving and pass it on to the Security Council for deliberation. Undeniably
the “warning signs” were plenty, but, again, how were the diplomats in NY to know that those
warning signs were actually of an event that would come to pass? The anti-Tutsi rhetoric has
been on-going since the revolution in 1959. Furthermore, with respect to the decision to pull out
the peacekeeping troops at the peak of the genocide, which many argue was a decision
championed by the United States, I want to bring into focus here events that unfolded in Somalia
just months before the genocide in Rwanda began.
The Somali Fiasco
The confidence that the UN and U.S. had going into Somalia was fueled by its successful
intervention in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during the Gulf War to repel an invading Iraqi army. It
was, to a significant extent, the most successful military intervention that the UN has ever had.
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And as a result of that remarkable triumph, the UN‘s fundamental goal of maintaining world
peace was finally starting to materialize, at least so it seemed. The UN Secretariat was very
inspired by the outcome, and it was keen to engage in similar undertaken in other conflict-ridden
nations around the world. Against this background, when the violence in Somalia became
increasingly severe, the UN and the U.S., understandably, did not hesitate to once again assume
the responsibility to bring peace to Somalia. Making the case for intervention both in the UN
General Assembly and Congress was, for all intents and purposes, effortless. Given that the
conflict in Somalia was more internal rather than an invasion by an established external military
force, as was the case with Iraq, the UN and the U.S thought it would be an easier, less intense
undertaken. They were wrong. It was a disaster; one that would precipitate a cascade of tragic
decisions that sealed the fate of the victims in Rwanda. The interventionists terribly misjudged
the gravity of the situation in Somalia. They found themselves engulfed and trapped in the
middle of a devastating clan war that they could not comprehend. Everything that could go
wrong in such a scenario had indeed gone wrong.
Therefore, any analysis of the failure of the international community in Rwanda that does
not consider how the Somali debacle impacted the decisions that were made is fundamentally
incomplete. The role that the Somali effect played in the appalling intervention in Rwanda is
unmistakable. It was the blueprint for the dreadful intervention in Rwanda. As highlighted
earlier, the trouble in Somalia began when a well-intentioned UN “humanitarian intervention” in
1991 soon turned into a blood-soaked operation that shocked the world. To the extent that by
1992, the situation in Mogadishu had severely deteriorated, forcing the UN to create the Unified
Task Force (UNITAF), spearheaded by the United States, and authorized to use force as
necessary (UN.org). Notwithstanding, this, too, turned out to be a deadly mistake, which would
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later haunt the US government, leading it to exercise devastatingly poor judgements when the
genocide in Rwanda started.
Nevertheless, most of the conversations that I have had with people while researching
this topic, and some of the materials that I have read with regards to the failure of the
international community in Rwanda, point to the United States as the agent that championed the
nonintervention campaign in Rwanda. This conclusion is, for the most part, based on the fact that
the United States lost 18 service members in that mission. However, what most critics fail to
realize is that the United States was not the only nation that suffered casualties in Somalia. For
example, 25 Pakistani soldiers were brutally killed during a single operation; their bodies were
mutilated and dragged through the streets. Nigerian soldiers, together with service members from
other African states, were also among the dead in Somalia (Peterson 2001). It is incredible how
these other factors do not seem to be considered when examining why the UN in general acted
poorly in Rwanda. The image of the UN, as an institution charged with maintaining and
promoting world peace, was altogether sternly tarnished as a result of that disaster. Confidence
was drastically low.
Again, what I am attempting to do here is to provide another perspective as to why the
United States and the international community, as a consequence of the Somali Fiasco, were
reluctant to intervene in Rwanda. The terrible images of that disaster were still raw in the minds
of world leaders and their citizens when the genocide in Rwanda broke out. The United States,
for instance, had just finished pulling out its last troops from Somalia literally 12 days before the
genocide in Rwanda started in earnest. The tragic events in Somalia, as far as Americans are
concerned, were a vivid reminder of the horrendous experience in Vietnam. The most significant
of these events occurred on October 3, 1993 (state.gov), when the forces of Farah Aideed shot
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down two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters during a fierce firefight in which 18 American service
members perished. This disastrous episode was replayed over and over in the American media,
so that public support for the intervention decreased dramatically. American politicians were
forced to revisit the American interventionist policy, and the degree to which it should
participate in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in other regions of the world. And so
when the Rwanda episode started less than a month later, it is conceivable that politicians in the
U.S. chose to deflect attention from Rwanda.
Moreover, when the killing in Rwanda started, 10 Belgian-UN troops were viciously
murdered when they attempted to protect the Rwandan Prime Minister from the Hutu militia.
“Their Achilles tendons were cut so they couldn’t run, and… castrated and died choking on their
genitalia” (Peterson 2001). Thus, with an unbearable incident like that – coupled with the
horrendous images from Somalia still playing on CNN – we must ask ourselves, is it really
conceivable to expect that world leaders would, without hesitation, refuel their war machines,
rally their soldiers, and deploy them to another ethnic conflict in the same region? Critics, myself
included, will do best to remember that the states that constitute the UN, including the United
States, are governed by rational, political actors, whose primary responsibility is to protect the
interest of their countries. Even if, allegedly, the United States spearheaded the denial of
genocide in Rwanda, other states – after what they have witnessed in Somalia – would not
require much convincing not to intervene. Peterson argues that the equation that the international
community employed was, “failure in Somalia equals failure in Rwanda.” I do not think that
equation was at all unreasonable, considering the circumstances. The tragedy in Somalia was a
consequence of poor management on the part of the UN, and lack of knowledge about the
indigenous people on the part of the interveners. These were not issues that could be fixed
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overnight. Therefore, to expect the UN, the United States, and other states to rapidly deploy a
response team to Rwanda – just twelve days after the US pulled out virtually every troop in
Somalia – is, in my opinion, unrealistic. Anyone with minimal knowledge about politics or how
governments function would know that gathering troops to intervene in conflicts is a process that
requires much deliberation and consideration.

Intervention in Government Killings
The issue of intervention in conflicts has recently become the focus of a very heated
debate. Scholars and others are divided with respect to the best means of interventions in civil
conflicts. Some (Kathman and Wood 2011) argue that impartial intervention is the best means to
reach a long term solution. According to Kathman and Wood, intervention in general
“exacerbates hostilities,” in the immediate term. However, others (Krain 2005; DeMeritt 2015) –
with whom I join in concurrence – hold that intervention against the government in a regimesanctioned killing is the most effective means to save civilian lives. My argument below will
show that any other form of intervention other than against the government would not have
succeeded in Rwanda. Besides, as I have already shown, the UN had been involved in the
conflict well before the genocide, and yet the massacre still took place. This reveals a
fundamental weakness in the impartial intervention argument. The UN is a neutral third party
that intervenes to attempt to prevent the escalation of violence against civilians, and end the war
altogether, but the result of that impartial intervention speaks for itself. That is not to say that
impartial intervention is ineffective. I think Kathman and Wood might be on to something with
their claim that impartial intervention could “reduce the magnitude of violence over the long
term.” However, this theory cannot be applied in the case of Rwanda. The reason is what
follows.
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The slaughter in Rwanda that claimed close to a million lives was orchestrated and
facilitated by the Hutu government. And the intervention by the international community to stop
the killing, in the form of the UN, was an epic failure. Next, I will present an argument
supporting the theory that in government-sanctioned killing, such as the 1994 massacre in
Rwanda, a military intervention against the government is the most effective means to curb the
civilian death toll. Although the UN intervention in Rwanda was in the form of a military
operation, I argue that one of the reasons why it failed to save civilian lives was because the
directives given to the soldiers on the ground was to remain neutral. The mandate was to
“observe” and “monitor.” My argument is that had the UN intervened against the Hutu
government, thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutu who perished would have been saved. A
military intervention against the government in a government-sanctioned killing of civilians
significantly limits civilian death toll (DeMeritt 2014). In her article, DeMeritt argues that we
need to “conceptualize government killing as a principal-agent problem.” She asserts that, in
today’s complex society, governments (principal) are finding it hard to codify policies and
implement them on their own. Consequently, they choose to hire experts (agents) to help them
implement their policies, which includes a policy to exterminate civilians. I follow DeMeritt’s
argument here to contextualize my intervention argument in the Rwandan genocide.
A military intervention against the Hutu government would have perfectly demonstrated
the significance of this theory. Foremost, it is imperative to understand that the Rwandan Army,
for the most part, was not directly involved in the killing of the Tutsi once the genocide started.
The army devoted almost all of its remaining resources to trying to fend off the fast advancing
RPF rebels. So the only option that was available to the government was to activate the civilian
defense force that it had trained and outfitted specifically for the purpose of killing Tutsi
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civilians. Some of these militant groups were led by one or two government soldiers, but mainly,
the leaders of these deadly groups were led by civilians. Their orders were very clear: they were
to go out and kill. In most African cultures – especially in Rwanda – this was enough to get
people to act in such heinous ways. “In Rwanda culture, everyone obeys authority. People revere
power, and there isn’t enough education. You take a poor, ignorant population, and give them
arms, and say: “It’s yours. Kill”. They’ll obey,” asserts a Rwandan lawyer in an interview with
Philip Gourevitch (Gourevitch 1998). Moreover, not all of the participant in the killing
volunteered or willingly joined the orgy. A good number of them were made to choose between
them and the victims by the leaders of the perpetrators. Others were warned that refusal to
participate was tantamount to denouncing one’s Hutu identity, which automatically makes the
individual a sympathizer and a traitor. Sympathizers and traitors were hacked to death along with
their Tutsi friends.
Given this, the objective of a UN military intervention in Rwanda would not necessarily
have been to challenge the national army. Rather, it would have been against the ill-disciplined,
poorly trained civilian defense force, speaking militarily. The war between the Hutu government
and the RPF has been ongoing since the beginning of the 1990, and both parties were welltrained, established military groups. There was no urgent rush to save anyone. The unarmed
civilians were the ones who needed saving. So any intervention effort would have been
fundamentally directed to that purpose.
Besides, the reason why the death toll is so high is because most of the victims were lured
to gather under single, respectable establishments (churches, hospitals, schools, stadiums, and
other government and public places), where they were trapped and butchered to death. In such
scenarios, very little military training was required to execute the trapped victims. The
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perpetrators used weapons such as grenades, automatic weapons, tear gas, and machetes to
efficiently accomplish their murderous mission. Had these locations been protected, the number
of deaths would have been drastically decreased.
After the killing started, the victims quickly realized that the open streets were unsafe,
due to the countless road blocks mounted by the killers. So they made the decision to gather in
the only few places (churches, schools, hospitals) they felt safe and expected protection. But they
were terribly mistaken. Those sanctuaries turned out to be where their fates were sealed. By
agreeing to converge in large numbers in these respective spaces, they spared their killers the
trouble of having to hunt them down in the bushy hills and other hidden locations. Consider the
following examples:
On April 11, five days after the killing started, in a small commune south of Byumba Prefecture
in the northern part of the country named Murambi close to 4,000 Tutsis were slaughtered under
the same roof (Krivoushin 2014). They were lured into the church by the parish priest, who
colluded with the infamous burgomaster, Jean-Baptiste Gatete - the leader of the militia in that
region. The priest convinced the parishioners that the killing was a sign of the apocalypse cited
in the Bible:
And I will show wonders in the heavens and in the Earth: Blood and fire and pillars of
smoke. The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before the coming
great and awesome day of the Lord, and it shall come to pass that whoever calls on the
name of the Lord shall be saved (Joel 2:30-32).
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He told them that the only way to be saved was to gather inside the church to confess and pray to
God to spare their lives. He locked them inside, and signaled Jean-Baptiste Gatete and his team
of killers, who went in and butchered all of them.
Another similar incident occurred in the southern part of the country, where a Parish
priest orchestrated the murder of 3,000 Tutsis who took refuge in his church (ibid). Cases like
these, in which victims were lured in large numbers into spaces they thought no one would
commit such horrible crimes, are the reason why the civilian death toll is so high. Similar horrific
incidents took place in town halls, schools, and hospitals (see Krivoushin 2014; Peterson 2000;
Gourevitch 1998; Des Forges, 1999). These are all huge spaces that could house thousands of
people, and when Tutsis fled their unprotected homes and converged in these various respective
places for safety, they unknowingly facilitated the successful achievement of the killers’ mission:
to decimate the Tutsi population in Rwanda. And given the death toll, it would be plausible to
argue that the overall objective of the Hutu extremists was a success. 70% of the Tutsi
population was annihilated by the time the killing ended (Gourevitch 1998).
The examples above are meant to demonstrate how a military intervention against the
perpetrators, by guarding at all costs such public spaces, would have saved a significant number
of the victims that perished. Thus, the primary objective of a military intervention would be to
defend these places and provide a safe haven for the fleeing victims. In such instances, the
security forces have to be instructed to use whatever force necessary to keep out the perpetrators,
and to protect the victims taking refuge inside. Neutrality or impartial presence would be
ineffective in such scenarios. The killing of the Belgians who attempted to protect the Prime
Minister and her family is a clear testament of the impracticality of that strategy. The Belgian
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soldiers were given strict orders not to engage the approaching, menacing militia (Peterson
2000), and as a result they were brutally murdered.
The International community must embrace the notion that in order for governments to
implement a policy to kill civilians, they need to establish a relationship between them (the
policymakers) and the perpetrators – the executioners of that policy. Further, it is best to always
assume that both are rational actors, and each actor has interests, incentives, and motives. A
perpetrator’s interests and incentives may not necessarily match that of the government. Thus, it
is safe to say that a perpetrator’s interest could sometimes force him to deviate from the original
government plan or directive to pursue his interest. The fundamental objective of a military
intervention, therefore, would be to create disincentives for the perpetrators, and effectively
sever the bond between them and the government. In the articles I referenced above supporting
military intervention against perpetrators, the authors make several assumptions about
perpetrators in government-sanctioned killings. I share three of them here to elucidate my
argument of why a military intervention against the government in Rwanda would have been
more ideal. I) Perpetrators have an interest in protecting their freedom. II) Governments and
perpetrators value their lives above the lives of others. III) Governments have an unparalleled
interest in retaining power.
Based on the first assumptions above and, in the context of the Rwanda genocide, I argue
that a military intervention against the Hutu government would have threatened to take away the
interest of freedom that the perpetrators. At bottom, the intervention against the government
would serve as a disincentive for the perpetrator carrying out the order given to them by the
government. Also, given the hostile nature of the military intervention that I am suggesting here
and, based on the assumption that perpetrators value their lives above the lives of others, I argue
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that the perpetrators in Rwanda would have shirked the order that the Hutu government had
given them to kill Tutsis.
Any intervention attempt must focus on how the intervention would affect the behavior
of the perpetrators (Krain 2005). Again, it is imperative to remember that the participants were
conditioned into thinking that their freedom was in danger of being taken away from them by the
invading Tutsi RPF rebels, and that if they did not act to protect their freedom the Tutsis would
send them back to the days of slavery; they would lose everything. Therefore, a hostile military
intervention would have served as counterincentive not to participate in the killing. The message
must be crystal clear: any attempt to kill civilians would be treated with extreme prejudice. This
increases the costs of participation, and sends a strong signal to the rational participant that the
freedom which he thinks he is fighting to protect would be taken away if he attempts to kill or
encourages others to kill.
This leads me to the second assumption that perpetrators value their lives above the lives
of others. The killers in Rwanda were not terrorists who were ready to die for their course. In
other words, they did not strap bombs around their bodies and run into houses and churches and
blew themselves up. For example, in areas where they encountered resistance or perceived
danger of injury or death, they retreated and waited for reinforcements. This proves that while
they were willing to kill Tutsis, they themselves were not prepared to lay down their lives in the
process. This gives impetus to my assumption: if a military intervention makes it clear, or even
demonstrates, that any perpetrator who kills a Tutsi or fellow Rwandan would be shot on sight
the number of participants would have been drastically reduced. This was the strategy that the
RPF rebel forces used, which is why they were able to stop the killing. Besides, a majority of the
weapons (machetes, clubs, etc.) were unconventional, and would have been ineffective against a
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hostile intervention military force, with advanced weapons that could take out targets from a
distance. This would have been very useful in keeping perpetrators form approaching safe zones
Additionally, it should be uncontroversial that the main reason why the Hutu government
went to war with the RPF and attempted to kill all the Tutsis was because it wanted to retain its
power and the monopoly on the use of legitimate force. Therefore, as the third assumption holds,
if the government suspects that the perpetrators would shirk the order to kill civilians, it would
not transmit the order, as a refusal to execute the order would be tantamount to challenging the
government’s authority and legitimacy.
The narrative above that chronicles the events that led to the transition from the First
Republic to the Second Republic proves that the Hutu government was not the most united
administration. Not all of them supported radicalism. Therefore, assuming that the hostile
intervention succeeds - with its explicit warning that anyone who tries to kill another would
himself be killed and hence forcing the perpetrators to shirk the orders to kill – the government
would not risk any further division by giving the order to exterminate the Tutsi. Doing so would
have given impetus to opposition parties within the government to capitalize on the situation and
maybe even convince the intervening parties to support them against the administration that
wants to eliminate its own people.
Furthermore, with a hostile intervention, the government would have been confronted by
a three-dimensional challenge: the RPF, the intervention force, and the victims themselves. It
would have been forced to critically think of the feasibility and its capacity to take on all three
agents. It clearly could not handle the two challenges of fighting the RPF on the one side and
killing the civilian Tutsis on the other, which is why it lost the war. Now imagine if there were
another (even more) hostile third party that it needed to fight or avoid in order to succeed. It does
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not require a genius to know that as one of the poorest and smallest country in Central Africa, the
government could not have been outfitted with the capacity to engage all three sides, or carry out
its extermination policy, under the circumstances that I just described. Krain (2005) aptly
defends this:
Challenging intervention force perpetrators to divert time and resources otherwise
dedicated to a policy of genocide or politicide toward defense against the external
challenge. Such interventions make state-sponsored mass murder a more difficult project
fraught with even more serious military and/or political consequences than had existed
previously. This, even if only temporarily, should stem the violence, especially if the
genocidal policy is being carried out by ‘thugs’ or ‘opportunistic bullies,’ who are
unlikely to put up too much of a fight against an outside force.
It is for this reason that I argue that a military intervention against the government in
Rwanda’s government-sanctioned killing would have been more effective in decreasing the
civilian death toll. The Hutus who participated in the killings, or watched while it occurred did
not challenge or threaten to shirk the government’s order to kill the Tutsis, giving the
government no cause to worry about its hold on power. And the Hutus did not challenge or
ignore the order because there was no incentive not to. There was no threat to their wellbeing if
they participated in the killing. Rather, they were rewarded for participation; by sharing the
booty, feeding their insatiable sexual desires, and drinking to stupor.

Conclusion
What I have attempted to do in this paper is to demonstrate the fundamental factors that
precipitated the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in an effort to provide a comprehensible explanation of
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why the Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed. I maintain that the most significant causes of the
genocide were the political legacy of colonialism, the 1959 revolution, and the RPF invasion in
1990. With respect to the failure of the international community to prevent the slaughter, I argue
that, although the international community could have saved thousands of lives had it properly
and strategically intervened, we need to also consider the factors that may have prevented the
international community from reacting fast enough. And the factors I highlighted were
Rwandan’s history of violence, and the fiasco in Somalia. I conclude with a theoretical
presentation of how a military intervention against the government would have been the ideal
recourse to employ in Rwanda. This is based on three assumptions: I) Perpetrators have an
interest in protecting their freedom. II) Governments and perpetrators value their lives above the
lives of others. III) Governments have an unparalleled interest in retaining power.
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